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ABSTRACT 
 
Malaysia’s National Front coalition, one of the world’s most durable authoritarian governments, lost 
power in national elections held in 2018. Although incumbent turnover represents a significant step 
toward democratization, the reform of institutions and practices associated with political domination 
by the country’s Malay Muslim majority has been slowed in the face of challenges from a new 
configuration of opposition forces. The new opposition, which includes UMNO, the former dominant 
party of the National Front, has framed democratic reforms initiated by the new government – and the 
more multiethnic ruling government itself – as a threat to the rights of the country’s largest 
ethnoreligious community. In turn, the new government, seeking to defuse the opposition’s electoral 
threat, and in part propelled to power by its commitment to preserve Malay Muslim political 
domination, has responded by maintaining non-democratic institutions and practices. The case 
highlights the extent to which the scope and scale of democratic reform are curbed not only by 
remnants of the former regime but also by newly elected governments seeking to maintain their 
position in power. 
 
KEYWORDS: Competitive authoritarian regimes, electoral turnovers, ethnic politics, authoritarian 
innovations, Malaysia 
 
Introduction 
In May 2018, for the first time in Malaysia’s history, a coalition government headed by the United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO) – since 1974, known as the National Front (BN) coalition – 
lost national power through elections. Long considered as a deviant case in the study of 
democratization given the persistence of authoritarian rule despite its wealth,1 Malaysia now seems to 
defy regional trends in Southeast Asia where authoritarianism remains predominant, and elections 
have not generally served to usher in democratization.2 UMNO’s 61-year reign in office was ended by 
a coalition of opposition parties headed by Mahathir Mohamad, the former autocratic prime minister 
who broke away from UMNO in 2016. The coalition led by Mahathir, the Alliance of Hope (Pakatan 
Harapan), won national power despite the institutional and resource advantages available to the ruling 
government remaining undiminished. As such, major reforms to legal, governing, and electoral 
institutions remain if the alternation of power is to lead to democratic transition. 
However, the dynamics of Malaysia’s reform process since the 2018 election demonstrate the 
conflicting incentives facing former opposition parties in introducing democratizing and liberalizing 
reforms after winning power.3 Although the Alliance of Hope quickly made important improvements 
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to electoral and governing institutions, reform of institutions and norms associated with Malay 
political dominance have made little headway. This article focuses primarily on the role of polarizing 
rhetoric and practices employed by the country’s new configuration of opposition actors, centered on 
UMNO and its competitor-turned-ally PAS. The opposition parties, along with allies in civil society, 
have framed the multiethnic government and potential democratizing reforms as an existential threat 
to the rights of the Malay Muslim ethnoreligious majority. The opposition has agitated against the 
alleged upset of racial and religious norms and institutions and questioned the suitability of non-
Malay and non-Muslim politicians and parties in steering Malaysia’s national government. In doing 
so, it has led the new government to retreat from key reforms that could erode its electoral support and 
legitimacy among Malay Muslims. Yet on certain issues, as is detailed further on, there is little 
difference between government and opposition positions, given that the new government came to 
power promising to preserve the ethnoreligious balance of power and is partly composed of personnel 
committed to preserving a Malay-first political structure. 
The focus of this special issue is on authoritarian innovations: practices undertaken by political actors, 
regardless of regime type, that serve to constrain public participation, sabotage accountability, and 
“disable voice”. As the issue’s editors argue, these authoritarian practices “curtail attempts to 
scrutinize and contest power both in formal political institutions and the broader public sphere.” This 
article uses the authoritarian innovations framework to analyse such practices deployed by Malaysia’s 
opposition since the historic election of 2018, focusing on the reform of institutions and norms that 
ensure Malay political power to the exclusion of minority groups and constraints on civil and religious 
liberties. Like authoritarian innovations in other cases discussed in this issue, the opposition has used 
legal and democratic channels, including protests, campaign messaging, and media statements. The 
objectives of these practices – and the government’s subsequent response – are largely rooted in 
electoral considerations, as UMNO in particular seeks to recover from a loss of political support and 
access to state power. Yet their cumulative effect is to slow or halt incremental advances that would 
contribute to Malaysia’s democratization. 
What makes these practices innovative, as the editors of the special issue argue, “does not lie in the 
practice per se, but the meanings attached to them”. Polarizing ethnic and religious rhetoric has long 
been a feature of political contestation in Malaysia, where ethnicity is “sown into the fabric of the 
economy, society, and the state”.4 Malaysia’s politics are built around a degree of multiethnic 
accommodation but, as Donald Horowitz has argued, the country has often been misclassified as a 
consociational system.5 Instead, the country’s constitution, political and economic institutions, and 
governing policies enshrine the political dominance of Malays and restrict some political rights for 
non-Malay minority groups. The long-ruling UMNO party governed the country through multiethnic 
ruling coalitions, but nevertheless championed a Malay-first ideology that justified the political 
subordination of ethnic and religious minorities. Yet the meaning of these practices shifted in recent 
years, as the two major parties now in opposition rejected or lost almost all of the multiethnic 
coalition partners that defined their electoral challenges. At the same time, the new government, 
elected with significant support from Malaysia’s ethnic and religious minorities, features politicians 
and parties portrayed by UMNO and its partner PAS as threats to the Malay Muslim community. This 
has imbued any moves toward widening the inclusion of non-Malays in governance and protecting 
civil and religious liberties with an ethnoreligious valence. The promise of democratization in the 
“New Malaysia”, as the post-UMNO period has been termed, is thus intimately tied to ethnoreligious 
politics and the balance of power in Malaysia’s multiethnic society. 
The dynamics of political contention highlighted in this article help illuminate an important puzzle in 
the study of competitive authoritarian regimes: why electoral turnovers do not always herald 
democratic transition.6 The case of Malaysia offers insight into how the strategies and public stances 
that political actors take towards democratization and liberalization following such elections condition 
the advance or retreat of democratic practice through specific policies and political decisions. 
Malaysia’s experience since the election also has implications for recent research on how 
authoritarian successor parties – parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes – help or hinder 
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democratization as they seek to “learn to win” in post-transition environments.7 Cut off from tools of 
coercion and patronage resources, former ruling parties are forced to retool their strategies, which 
may involve delegitimizing the victorious new government and deepening ethnoreligious polarization. 
However, as the case of Malaysia shows, ruling governments both respond to such opposition 
strategies and innovate on their own, given that they are in the strongest position to effect change or 
maintain existing semi-democratic institutions and norms. 
Authoritarian innovation within democratizing contexts 
Although electoral turnovers are sometimes used to indicate democratic transition, a body of 
scholarship has observed that the alternation of power does not necessarily lead to democratization.8 
The distinction between these two concepts is particularly salient in competitive authoritarian regimes 
like Malaysia, where elections may be competitive enough to allow determined oppositions to win 
power but the architecture of authoritarian rule remains in place. Incumbent turnover thus offers a 
moment of opportunity for democratic transition – or alternately, competitive authoritarianism under 
new management. 
If democratization does not automatically follow from electoral turnover, then it relies on the new 
government to make “a series of discrete changes in the rules and informal procedures that shape 
elections, rights, and accountability”.9 The accumulation of incremental advances in these arenas is 
the most likely path to democratization in cases like Malaysia, where change in government took 
place through existing semi-democratic institutions. However, democratization is contingent on the 
strategic choices taken by both electoral victors and losers. Newly elected governments may come to 
power having promised democratic reform, but end up maintaining incumbent advantages that could 
help them maintain power in subsequent elections. Former ruling parties and their allies in opposition 
can decide to play by democratic rules by legitimating the electoral process and generating support for 
democracy. Alternately, they can seek to delegitimate electoral outcomes, destabilize the new 
government, or try to preserve existing authoritarian institutions – effectively preempting democratic 
change.10 
The broader literature on authoritarian politics has tended to focus attention on changes to electoral 
institutions, assuming that the “rules of the game” and control over the electoral process are the 
primary issues over which ruling parties and oppositions contest. But in Malaysia, political 
controversy has instead centered on the implications of democratization for the country’s 
ethnoreligious balance of power. The election results open up the potential to increase minority 
inclusion in politics and governance, reduce the political power wielded by the ethnic Malay 
monarchy, and strengthen protections of civil liberties and religious freedom. These represent 
expansions on the dimensions of inclusiveness and public contestation that characterize Dahl’s 
conceptualization of democracy.11 Additionally, the lack of protection of civil liberties may 
effectively restrain all or some groups of citizens from exercising control over political decision-
making, and therefore “constitute a floor for democracy”.12 In multiethnic societies like Malaysia, 
democratization brings with it contestation over the relative status and the balance of power between 
majority and minority groups, the division of wealth, interest representation, and citizenship.13 Rather 
than examine the many expressions of these issues in Malaysian politics, this article focuses narrowly 
on practices employed by political actors that directly or indirectly undermine the rights of ethnic and 
religious minorities to fully participate in politics. They serve as “constraints on meaningful public 
participation” that characterize authoritarian innovations discussed in the special issue. 
The majority of pieces in the special issue, as well as recent literature on democratic erosion and 
backsliding, have focused attention on authoritarian innovations employed by incumbent 
governments, who may use state power to manipulate elections, marginalize opposition, and 
undermine institutional constraints.14 Yet the actors that champion authoritarian innovations that seek 
to restrain or roll back democratic deepening are not only ruling government elites seeking to preserve 
their position: former authoritarian parties may employ them to mobilize supporters and seek a path 
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back to power, both directly and indirectly supporting authoritarian institutions.15 As will be shown in 
Malaysia, lack of access to state power and resources has provided strong incentives for actors outside 
of the ruling government to employ authoritarian innovations to retain political influence and for the 
newly elected government to respond. This electorally motivated interaction between ruling and 
opposition parties serves to preserve and even deepen democratic restraints since the preservation of 
existing norms and institutions are seen as key to electoral support. 
The 2018 elections and a reshuffling of power 
The polarizing politics of post-National Front Malaysia are in part a result of where the country’s 
most important political actors found themselves in the wake of the 2018 election. On its face, the 
election marked a significant reconfiguration of the levers of power. Despite polls and political 
observers predicting that the UMNO-dominated National Front coalition would win with a diminished 
share of the vote, the National Front lost decisively to the Alliance of Hope opposition coalition. As 
Figure 1 shows, the 2018 elections marked the third straight election in which national support for the 
National Front declined – but resulted in the most dramatic fall yet in the coalition’s share of seats and 
votes.  
Figure 1. Parliamentary election results for UMNO and the National Front, 1999–2018. 
 
Since the election, scholars have focused on a number of factors to explain the Alliance of Hope’s 
win: intra-party conflict within UMNO, the opposition’s success in building a strong and cohesive 
coalition, three-way electoral contests that siphoned votes from the ruling coalition, and not least, the 
massive corruption scandal involving the sitting Prime Minister Najib Razak that first came to public 
attention in 2015.16 The scandal led former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to quit and form his 
own party, attracting further prominent defectors.17 Mahathir and his new party, Bersatu, comprised 
mainly of former UMNO members, joined the opposition Alliance of Hope coalition in 2015, which 
in turn selected Mahathir to serve as their prime ministerial candidate. 
The rout of the National Front on election day turned out only to be the beginning. In the months 
following the election, the 13-party coalition began losing members and has been whittled down to its 
original three parties. Defections from National Front legislators at the state level further extended the 
Alliance of Hope’s hold on state governments and reduced National Front-controlled governments to 
two marginal and resource-poor states. UMNO initially emerged from the 2018 elections with 54 of 
the 222 seats in the national parliament, a significant drop from its 88 seats in the 2013 elections, but 
still the most of any single party. However, it began soon began losing politicians. Nine of the thirteen 
UMNO legislators that left the party joined Mahathir’s Bersatu party, while the remainder declared 
themselves independents.18 As of September 2019, UMNO holds only 37 seats in the national 
parliament, with other National Front parties holding just three additional seats. The party also faced a 
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difficult internal reckoning following the election as graft and money laundering charges were 
brought against high-level UMNO politicians, most notably in the ongoing trial of the former prime 
minister and UMNO president Najib Razak. A June 2018 survey of UMNO members revealed that 
60% viewed their party’s situation as either “shaky” or “dead”.19 
The election also cemented the outsider path of the influential Malay Muslim opposition party, the 
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). PAS is perhaps best known for its conservative Islamic 
orientation, having championed the implementation of a strict Islamic penal code for Muslims, known 
as hudud, at both the state and national level. Despite its hardline message, PAS had been a consistent 
member of opposition coalitions competing against UMNO. But beginning in 2015, PAS broke with 
the opposition and pursued greater ties with UMNO over Islamic issues. Its moderate personnel were 
purged from the party and formed their own splinter party, Amanah, which joined the opposition 
Alliance of Hope coalition. PAS contested the 2018 elections without joining either the National Front 
or Alliance of Hope coalitions. In the election, PAS deepened its hold on regionally concentrated 
Malay Muslim voters and lost its foothold in multiethnic constituencies. 
These electoral dynamics reinforced the gulf between the ethnic and religious electoral support of 
UMNO and PAS and the victorious Alliance of Hope coalition. Despite the prominence of Mahathir 
Mohamed and his Malay Muslim party in government, the Alliance of Hope coalition is markedly 
more multiethnic than the predecessor National Front government: It has significant multiethnic 
representation in parliament and non-Malay politicians in key cabinet positions. The cabinet, for 
example, includes an ethnic Chinese Finance Minister, the first in 44 years.20 The coalition is also less 
numerically dominated by its Malay Muslim component parties, a departure from UMNO’s effective 
control over its coalition, the National Front. Finally, the Alliance of Hope won power primarily on 
the basis of its support among the country’s non-Malay population, having only garnered an estimated 
30% support of the country’s majority ethnic population of Malay Muslims. By contrast, the bulk of 
the Malay Muslim vote was won by UMNO and PAS. 
For parties like UMNO, electoral defeat requires strategies to deal with what Loxton and Mainwaring 
call the “authoritarian baggage” of authoritarian successor parties in a new political environment.21 
UMNO’s strategies after the election suggested an embrace rather than repudiation of its previous 
term in power. UMNO’s internal party elections after 2018 displayed the “strength of support for the 
status quo” within the party, bringing a conservative hard liner to the party presidency and continuing 
to support former Prime Minister Najib even as he stands criminal trial for corruption.22 Rather than 
transforming UMNO from a closed race-based party to a multiracial party, mooted by some UMNO 
leaders after the election and supported by 50% of UMNO members in a post-election survey, the 
party instead maintained and deepened its ethnic strategy. Working together in an electoral alliance 
with PAS, and coordinating with a loose coalition of civil society groups, the party quickly converged 
on campaign rhetoric, statements, and street actions that emphasize the threats to Malay Muslim rights 
and Malay-first institutions allegedly posed by the new government. These actions both directly and 
indirectly seek to preserve the authoritarian policies of the National Front, including continued 
restrictions on civil and political liberties for the country’s citizens, the limiting of inclusion of 
minorities in governing national politics, and the preservation of the political power of the country’s 
hereditary Malay monarchy. 
To be sure, the messaging and public actions of both UMNO and PAS draw on familiar tropes and 
strategies employed prior to 2018. Even while working in multiethnic coalitions, both parties 
strategically emphasized the threats that Malaysia’s minority groups posed to Malay Muslim 
supremacy. Yet, as Johan Saravanamuttu argues, Malaysian post-independence politics have 
traditionally featured electoral incentives for opposition and ruling parties to work in coalitions that 
“[soften] the most extreme ethnic, religious and cultural demands and gravitates its actors towards 
win-win or variable sum outcomes rather than zero-sum ones”.23 In the current period, both UMNO 
and PAS no longer draw from multiracial support coalitions. PAS cut ties with its former opposition 
allies in 2015 and more openly pursued cooperation with UMNO. UMNO saw its multiethnic 
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coalition collapse after the 2018 elections, furthering the erosion of its non-Malay support as seen in 
previous elections. The current political dynamics thus represent the continuation of a “pull towards 
extremist and purist ethnic and religious lines” that gained particular prominence in the years leading 
up to 2018.24 
Ironically, even as UMNO and PAS sought to portray the new government as a threat to the special 
rights of Malays and Islam, the results of the election also saw the return of many familiar BN-era 
figures to the new government who express a shared goal of preserving Malay-first institutions and 
norms. Most notably, Prime Minister Mahathir and personnel from his party, Bersatu, are former 
UMNO politicians who explicitly sought to attract support from Malay voters. Like UMNO, the party 
restricts full membership to only “indigenous” Malaysians.25 Although the new government includes 
multiethnic parties and politicians with civil society and activist backgrounds, their influence over the 
reform process is tempered by the prominence of politicians espousing a “Malay first” vision – and 
has receded as the actions and statements of UMNO and PAS have imbued democratic reforms with 
racial and religious politics. 
Political inclusion and civil liberties as threats to Malay Muslim dominance 
In the months following the election, the new Alliance of Hope coalition government made important 
reforms to electoral and governing institutions without attracting public controversy. The Election 
Commission was removed from under the Office of the Prime Minister and placed under 
parliamentary authority. The parliament, with support from both ruling government and opposition 
MPs, passed amendments that would lift bans on university students from engaging in political 
activities, lowered the voting age from 21 to 18, and provided for automatic voter registration. The 
government has already enacted other reforms that will reduce its access to state resources and tools 
of coercion, including the reduction of the power and resources of the Office of the Prime Minister, 
the separation of the positions of Finance Minister and Prime Minister, and greater autonomy for the 
Anti-Corruption Commission. A host of other promised reforms remain, including laws to regulate 
political financing and to reduce the abuse of state resources for electoral purposes, reform of the 
state-owned enterprise sector, and democratic reforms of parliamentary procedures. 
However, public pressure from the new opposition did not focus on support or opposition for these 
reforms. Instead, through a series of protests, statements, and election campaigns, the opposition 
campaigned against potential reforms that would provide protection of basic civil and religious 
liberties, called into question the proper position of ethnic minorities in national politics, and called 
for vigilance against alleged threats to the country’s racial and religious hierarchy. Although 
contention over ethnic and religious issues long predate the transition of power at the national level, 
these authoritarian innovations by the opposition – and the subsequent response by the ruling coalition 
– have impeded democratic progress in the New Malaysia. 
One of the key authoritarian innovations of the opposition has targeted the inclusion of non-Malay 
Muslim leadership in the new Alliance of Hope government and the purported upset of the ethnic and 
religious hierarchy of political power following the election. The primacy of Malay Muslim political 
power is written into Malaysia’s institutions, and was long a justification for UMNO’s dominant role 
in politics, particularly after the 1969 ethnic riots that solidified UMNO dominance within an 
increasingly authoritarian ruling government. UMNO leaders espoused a Malay-first ideology that 
contended that the country’s social contract was based on Malay supremacy (ketuanan Melayu) in 
politics.26 Indeed, the country’s indigenous (Bumiputera) population (of which the majority are 
Malays) receive constitutional guarantees of their “special position” that include quotas in the civil 
service, the economic sector, and in public education.27 The special rights of the Malays, written into 
the constitution with the intention of providing a temporary solution to inter-group inequalities in the 
new Malaysian state,28 became a central motivating feature of UMNO’s rule. Although non-Malay 
Muslims have assumed a portion of cabinet positions in successive governments, the positions of 
deputy prime minister and prime minister have always been held by Malay Muslims. There are 
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additionally restrictions on non-Malays assuming office in state government: Non-Malay Muslims are 
prohibited in nine of thirteen state-level constitutions from assuming the position of Chief Minister, 
the highest level of state office.29 
In the four byelections held since the 2018 national election, UMNO and PAS have highlighted 
alleged threats to Malay Muslim rights and institutions by the new government. As documented by 
the electoral watchdog Bersih, polarizing rhetoric featured prominently in their appeals. A senior 
UMNO politician on the campaign trail stated that the new government had too many “passengers” 
(i.e. non-Malays) in parliament and that it had betrayed Malay rights by appointing non-Malays to 
cabinet positions.30 (The composition of the government, which features multiethnic parties and non-
Malay Muslims in important cabinet positions, has been repeatedly targeted by the opposition as proof 
of changes to the ethnic balance of power.) Another UMNO politicians argued that the DAP, an 
ethnic Chinese-majority party in the ruling government, sought to “disappear” Malays, and as a result 
Christians had taken over the national government with the agenda of spreading Christianity.31 The 
head of the UMNO Youth Wing stated that “as long as DAP [upholds] their so-called principals of 
wanting all races to be equal, it indirectly sends a message that they are undermining the country’s 
social contract”.32 While not directly referring to the new government, several weeks before a January 
2019 byelection, PAS leader Hadi Awang warned of the dangers of Muslims being led by non-
Muslims, echoing his previous statements about the necessity of Malay Muslims holding top decision 
making posts in the Cabinet and in national leadership.33 
These messages have not been confined to election campaigning. Since the 2018 election, successive 
street rallies organized by UMNO, PAS, and allied civil society organizations have focused on alleged 
degradations of Malay rights and institutions under the Alliance of Hope government. The rallies have 
touched on a wide range of issues, including threats by the new government to the position of Islam as 
the national religion, Malay special rights, and proposed government recognition of independent 
Chinese-language schools. This messaging prompted the new government’s leaders to insist they will 
not tamper with Malay-first rights. Following a series of opposition rallies, the Home Minister 
Muhyiddin Yassin declared that “I want to tell the Malays that [after the election, they] did not lose 
their power. The one losing power was UMNO”.34 
The opposition has also sought to claim a role in protecting the institution of the Malay Rulers, an 
ethnic monarchy that draws from nine regional royal families to elect the King of Malaysia for a five-
year term. The Malaysian constitution tasks the King as the guardian of Islam and the special rights of 
Malays. While not as powerful as monarchies found in other authoritarian systems, the Malay Rulers 
still qualify as a reserve domain, where “specific areas of governmental authority and substantive 
policy-making” are removed from the purview of elected officials, and by extension the public.35 
Among their powers, the Malay Rulers have final approval over any potential legislative changes to 
the constitutionally mandated special rights of the Malays. They also exert state-level political power, 
where they appoint Chief Ministers, the highest position in state government, usually from politicians 
nominated by the state legislature. 
The preservation of the monarchy’s reserve domain has not only been the province of the new 
opposition. In its election manifesto, the Alliance of Hope pledged its support for the powers of the 
Malay Rulers, accusing UMNO and the National Front of ignoring the monarchy and promising to 
“restore the dignity of Malays and Malay institutions”. Indeed, the King played a key role in 
legitimating the new government, accepting Mahathir as the new Prime Minister (although not 
without delays to doing so) and issuing a royal pardon for opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim for his 
jailing over sodomy. However, since taking over again as prime minister, Mahathir has criticized 
attempts by the Malay Rulers to exert power over political decisions by the federal government, and 
stated he would amend the constitution to curb their power if the government had a sufficient majority 
in parliament to do so.36 During his previous tenure as prime minister, the government had passed 
constitutional amendments stripping the royalty of their power to veto legislation at the state and 
federal level.37 
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Even as reforms to the country’s monarchy remain politically unviable in the short term, the 
opposition has used alleged threats to the power and sovereignty of the Malay Rulers to argue against 
Malaysia’s accession to the International Criminal Court (ICC). After the Alliance of Hope 
government acceded to the Rome Statute of the ICC, UMNO criticized the government for not 
consulting with the Malay Rulers and claimed that joining the ICC would erode the sovereignty and 
privileges of the Rulers.38 The Alliance of Hope then scuttled its commitment to the ICC just weeks 
after its accession. The government reportedly reversed its decision because it was concerned about its 
hold on power and the perception of a conflict between the government and the monarchy.39 
The second area of authoritarian innovation by the opposition has been aimed at halting the expansion 
of civil liberties and protection of human rights in the name of protecting Malay Muslim identity. 
Malaysia’s civil liberties and religious freedoms were limited under the National Front. The country is 
classified in Tier Two of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(USCIRF) for violations of religious freedom. Restrictions on religious freedom extend both to 
majority and minority groups in Malaysia: Malaysia’s constitution stipulates that Malays are by 
definition followers of Islam, effectively binding religious identity to ethnic Malays.40 Malay Muslims 
(and Muslims in general) have limited ability to change religion; conversion away from Islam is 
technically possible but is under the jurisdiction of Islamic courts and is rarely undertaken. Non-Sunni 
sects of Islam are illegal in Malaysia and adherents are subject to prosecution or forced 
rehabilitation.41 Under the National Front, Malaysia did not ratify key UN human rights conventions, 
including the Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). 
In the wake of the 2018 election, Prime Minister Mahathir addressed the UN General Assembly 
where he pledged that Malaysia would ratify remaining UN treaties. While their ratification would not 
likely have immediate impact on domestic policies, the treaties – particularly ICERD, which focuses 
on the eradication of racial discrimination – became a focal point for the opposition. The controversy 
was ignited after prominent politicians, including UMNO politician Khairy Jamaluddin, claimed that 
implementing ICERD would directly conflict with preserving Malay special rights. PAS leader Hadi 
Awang followed suit, arguing that it was compulsory for Muslims to oppose ICERD as it would put 
Islam at the same level of other religions in the country. These arguments were refuted by 
constitutional experts, who noted that the convention allowed exceptions that meant the special rights 
policies outlined in Malaysia’s constitution would not be affected.42 
As controversy over ICERD grew, UMNO president Zahid Hamidi warned that its ratification could 
lead Malays to riot (amuk).43 Rallies organized in two of Malaysia’s regional cities, one organized by 
the vigilante anti-vice organization Skuad Badar and the other by UMNO and PAS, drew thousands. 
Two coalitions of Malay and Muslim NGOs planned a massive rally against ICERD ratification in the 
capital Kuala Lumpur in December 2018. The street mobilizations had their intended effect: As the 
scheduled date of the December rally grew closer, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a statement 
saying that the government would not move forward on ratifying the convention. The statement 
offered a justification that echoed opposition claims that ICERD would tamper with Malay rights, 
stating that Malaysia’s constitution already contained a “social contract which has been agreed upon 
by the representatives of all races”.44 Ruling coalition politician Anwar Ibrahim declared afterwards 
that the government needed to assure Malays that their special rights, the position of Malay rulers, and 
the Malay language would be preserved. Malaysia remains one of 14 countries worldwide that have 
not ratified ICERD. 
The December rally went forward despite the retreat on ICERD ratification by the government. 
Estimates put attendance of the rally at up to 80,000 participants, the largest such demonstration since 
the new government was elected. PAS declared a special holiday in its state stronghold of Kelantan to 
allow state residents to attend. The rally featured speeches by the presidents of UMNO and PAS and 
included a prominent role for the NGO Islamic Defenders Movement (Gerakan Pembela Ummah), 
itself a coalition of 300 smaller Islam-oriented NGOs.45 Malaysia’s Human Rights Commission 
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(Suhakam) organized a much smaller pro-human rights rally on the same day; Prime Minister 
Mahathir rescinded his plans to attend after the government reversed course on ICERD ratification. 
Political effects 
Authoritarian innovations targeting the widening of minority inclusion in politics, the protection of 
civil liberties and human rights, and preserving reserve domains are likely to persist in the near term. 
With the effective collapse of its multiethnic supporting coalition, UMNO lost much of its multiracial 
support and legitimacy and reduced the party’s dependence on even nominal support from non-Malay 
Muslims. Its political disarray and loss of access to state resources in the post-election period limit the 
party’s ability to coalesce support around patronage politics or performance legitimacy as in the 
past.46 For both UMNO and PAS, hewing to Malay Muslim identity is a pragmatic move, given that 
they emerged from the election with regional and demographic bases of support that are 
predominantly Malay Muslim. This mobilizational strategy will only grow in importance after the two 
parties formalized their alliance in elections and as an opposition bloc – what UMNO’s deputy 
president termed their “marriage” after the 2018 elections. 
A hardline Malay Muslim electoral coalition between UMNO and PAS could help the opposition 
make headway among Malay-majority constituencies, which make up slightly more than half of the 
country’s constituencies.47 However, to be successful at a large scale, an UMNO-PAS coalition would 
still have to wrest back a significant portion of the Malay-majority seats won by the Alliance of Hope 
government, which won 42% of those seats in 2018.48 Given the multiethnic realities of Malaysia’s 
electoral districts, UMNO and PAS cannot win national power without attracting support in 
multiethnic seats via additional coalition partners beyond the remnants of the BN coalition.49 Putting 
aside other scenarios such as the collapse of the current government or one or the other opposition 
parties joining the ruling coalition, a clear path to national power for UMNO and PAS remains 
uncertain several years prior to the next general election. Nevertheless, delegitimizing and polarizing 
rhetoric by the opposition will continue to shape government behaviour, as well as amplifying voices 
in the current government that resist reform. 
Perceptions of the Alliance of Hope’s weakness in mobilizing support among Malays, and the post-
election effects of the opposition’s strategies, appears to be borne out by survey evidence. Two waves 
of a survey by Merdeka Center in 2017 and 2018 found that Malay voters identified the preservation 
of Malay rights – an issue tied both to racial and economic issues, given the preferential policies 
targeted at the country’s Bumiputera population – as the most important issue.50 Post-election surveys 
have shown a consistent ethnoreligious gap in support for government policies and politicians: The 
current government and prime minister have relatively strong public support, with Prime Minister 
Mahathir receiving a 62% approval rating in June 2019. But this support is uneven across racial 
groups; Malay respondents were 27% less satisfied with Mahathir’s leadership than Chinese 
respondents. In the same poll, only 31% of Malay respondents reported the country was heading in 
the right direction, compared to 53% of Chinese and 45% of Indian respondents.51 Another survey 
conducted between October-December 2018 found that 60% of Malay respondents were dissatisfied 
with the performance of the government thus far, and 54% agreed that the government was ignoring 
Malay rights and Islamic interests. In line with the messaging from UMNO and PAS, 62% agreed that 
the DAP, a largely ethnic Chinese party in the governing coalition, was controlling the government’s 
agenda.52 
While majority support from the Malay community was not necessary for the Alliance of Hope to win 
power, shifts its existing support among Malays, or reduced turnout, could potentially threaten its hold 
on national power in the next general election. The Malay swing vote is largely concentrated in 
Malay-majority seats, while the non-Malay population is concentrated in Alliance of Hope stronghold 
seats.53 Mooted reforms to other forms of Bumiputera social rights, such as quotas in economy and 
education, could further erode the Alliance of Hope’s electoral appeal among Malays. Further shifts in 
the balance of power in the parliament after the election, however, may have lessened these 
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apprehensions. The post-election incorporation of defecting UMNO legislators into Mahathir’s 
Bersatu party has strengthened the Alliance of Hope’s hold on the national government and further 
reduced UMNO’s sway in parliament. However, the incorporation of UMNO politicians by the 
government is likely to further shift political discourse away from reform and towards preserving 
existing semi-democratic institutions and norms. 
Although the previous section focused largely on the agency of the opposition and government 
response, it is important to note that the Alliance of Hope’s policy agenda closely aligns with the 
opposition in several arenas. The current government has continued past practice in rejecting same-
sex marriage and failing to institute protection of LGBT rights.54 It has also continued to use the 
Sedition Act, a colonial-era law that in its current form forbids the questioning of Malay special 
rights, Malay as the national language, and the sovereignty of the Malay monarchy. While the 
Alliance of Hope government promised to abolish the Act (a promise also made by the previous 
Prime Minister), it continues to file sedition reports. In one recent case, a politician from the 
governing party DAP, filed a sedition report against a senior UMNO politician who claimed that the 
Chinese-majority DAP was controlling the new government and that its agenda was to make Malaysia 
a republic headed by non-Muslims.55 The opposition also supports the Sedition Act’s continuation; 
UMNO’s strategic communications unit argued that the repealing of the Sedition Act would lead to a 
“liberal system” in Malaysia where sedition and slander would go unpunished and would eventually 
lead to the abolishment of the monarchy.56 
Similarly, both Mahathir and the opposition have opposed the reintroduction of local elections. 
Malaysia is one of a minority of countries in the world that does not hold local elections below the 
state or provincial level.57 The last local elections for district and municipal councils in Malaysia were 
held in 1963. After their official ban in 1964 during a period of deepening authoritarianism, they were 
never reinstated. Mahathir argued that the reintroduction of local elections could lead to racial 
conflict, a stance shared by the opposition and associated NGOs. While some politicians in the ruling 
government support local elections, the association of elections with polarizing ethnic politics will 
likely further diminish efforts within the government and by civil society to reinstate them. 
Conclusion 
The alteration of national power in Malaysia after 61 years of dominant party rule is a hopeful 
breakthrough in a region that has proven stubbornly resistant to democratization. The result of the 
election has at a minimum led to what Howard and Roessler term a “liberalizing electoral outcome”, 
where elections in competitive authoritarian regimes lead to incremental improvements in elections 
and civil liberties. Malaysia’s ranking in Freedom House indicators has registered a slight uptick in its 
aggregate score for 2018, although its overall ratings on political rights and civil liberties remain 
unchanged from 2017. The harassment and targeting of the opposition that marked political 
competition under the National Front, as well as restrictions on free assembly and massive 
deployment of media and state machinery are likely to be muted – but not eliminated – under the new 
government.58 Importantly, blatant abuses of power would likely face much stronger resistance and 
outcry from the general public. It appears unlikely that Malaysians would accept a return to the 
political restraints that characterized the National Front government. Instead, what is at stake in “New 
Malaysia” is less a process of democratic backsliding, breakdown, or authoritarian retrenchment – as 
in the case of other countries considered in this special issue – and more about the scale and scope of 
democratization. 
In Malaysia’s divided society, inclusiveness, contestation, and civil liberties are all tightly linked with 
legacies of racial and religious political competition. This article has highlighted how the interactions 
between the new ruling government and the opposition have shaped what the special issue’s editors 
call the “micropolitical decisions that changes the character of regimes” within this broader political 
environment. The opposition has framed the expansion of civil liberties, the rolling back of “reserve 
domains”, and greater inclusiveness for the country’s minorities as threats to Malay Muslim 
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dominance. Its use of polarizing political messages around ethnic and religious domination, and 
casting doubt on the legitimacy of the new government and rule by non-Malays and non-Muslims, not 
only directly and indirectly support non-democratic practices and institutions, but also seek to position 
these issues as fundamentally beyond the scope of democratic debate or discussion. However, while 
these authoritarian innovations may find their loudest proponents in the opposition, they have proved 
effective both because they are shared by prominent members of the new government, and also 
because they induce responsiveness from it. The perceived need of the new government to shore up its 
electoral support, as well the porous boundary between the former ruling parties and current 
government, offers ample opportunity for the ruling government to ensure the continuation of non-
democratic institutions or even champion further authoritarian innovations themselves. 
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